Killing Innocent People

1 Introduction

Suppose that a soldier is fighting in a war that is just. His unit is about to be attacked by child soldiers who he knows were earlier forcibly abducted from their homes, brutalized, indoctrinated, and convincingly lied to about their adversaries’ aims. Before being sent into combat, these children are also involuntarily administered drugs that suppress their inhibitions about killing people. The soldier believes, let us suppose correctly, that these child soldiers are not only not culpable for the threats they pose, but are not morally responsible for them at all. They are what I will call nonresponsible threateners. One of them, who seems to be about twelve years old, has just appeared and will kill the soldier unless the soldier kills him. Is it permissible for the soldier to defend his life by killing the child soldier?

Although both common sense moral intuition and the traditional theory of the just war say that it is permissible for this soldier to kill the child soldier in self-defense, some philosophers have argued that it is not. In 1994, for example, Michael Otsuka and I independently wrote and published essays in which we each argued (1) that it is normally impermissible to kill an innocent bystander in the course of defending the life of another person, (2) that there is no morally significant difference between an innocent bystander and a nonresponsible threatener, and (3) that it is therefore normally impermissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener either in self-defense or in defense of another person (“other-defense”).

The argument that Otsuka presented is, however, superior to the one I advanced in two respects. First, he restricts his discussion to nonresponsible threateners, whereas I defended the broader claim, which I now reject, that it is normally impermissible to kill an innocent threatener, who might be either nonresponsible or morally responsible but not culpable. Second, Otsuka compared killing a nonresponsible threatener both with killing an innocent person as side effect of defensive action and with using the killing of an innocent bystander as a means of self-preservation, whereas I compared it only with the latter. As we will see, it is crucial that Otsuka’s argument includes the comparison with killing as a side effect.

Helen Frowe believes that it is often permissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener in self- or other-defense. She believes, for example, that it is permissible for the soldier to kill the child soldier who will otherwise kill him. She devotes the first three chapters of Defensive Killing to a discussion of nonresponsible threateners, to whom she refers as “innocent threats.”


2 For elucidation, see Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), ch. 4.

considerations that are together intended to show that in certain cases it can be permissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener in defense of only a single person. My aims in this essay are to defend Otsuka’s argument, to explain why I find Frowe’s positive arguments unconvincing, and to offer further arguments for the claim that it is normally impermissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener in defense of a single victim.

2 Frowe’s Critical Argument

Frowe does not dispute the intuition stated in premise (1) of the argument that Otsuka and I gave (that it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander in the course of defending the life of only one other person), though, as we will see, she interprets it more narrowly than either of us did. She does, however, reject premise (2), which she and Otsuka call the Moral Equivalence Thesis. She does not claim that a nonresponsible threatener has a different moral status from that of an innocent bystander; rather, the moral difference between killing a nonresponsible threatener and killing an innocent bystander is in the different modes of agency. Warren Quinn distinguishes between harmful “agency that benefits from the presence of the victim” and harmful agency that “aims to remove an obstacle or difficulty that the victim presents.” And he suggests that “it would not be surprising if we regarded fatal or harmful exploitation as more difficult to justify than fatal or harmful elimination.” We can, following Frowe, call the first of these forms of agency “exploitative,” and, following Quinn, call the second “eliminative.” According to Quinn’s understanding, both exploitative and eliminative harms are intended as a means. The difference is that exploitative harming involves using the victim, and thus requires her presence, whereas eliminative harming does not.

Frowe embraces Quinn’s plausible suggestion that the constraint against exploatively harming an innocent person is stronger than that against eliminatively harming an innocent person. And indeed traditional deontological ethics has generally held that the harmful using of a person is specially objectionable. I believe, however, that Frowe both overstates and understates her case here.

She understates it by claiming that what is particularly morally objectionable about exploitative killing is that it “manifests the attitude that the innocent person is a tool to be appropriated for gain by others.” “This,” she writes, “is what makes [such killings] wrong: ...that [they] exhibit a particularly morally abhorrent attitude towards the person one kills.” But the constraint against exploitative killing is not primarily a constraint against having a certain attitude. One might have that attitude towards a person but never act on it. That would be objectionable but what is particularly objectionable is acting in a way that harmfully and nonconsensually uses a person as a means to one’s ends.

She overstates her case when she argues that harming a bystander without her consent to avoid anything other than a much greater harm to another innocent person always treats

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6 Frowe, pp. 53-53 (emphasis in the original).
her as a means. This is why it is impermissible to harm bystanders in the course of defending oneself. In contrast, harming a person who poses a threat—innocent or otherwise—does not treat that person as a mere means. Here Frowe seems to acknowledge that what is particularly objectionable about self- or other-preservative action that kills an innocent bystander is not just that it manifests a certain attitude but that it actually harms the person as a means. There are, however, two problems in this passage. One is that the eliminative killing of a nonresponsible threatener also treats that person as a means, as killing her is the defender’s intended means of defense. It does not, of course, involve using her as a means, but using someone is not the only way of harming her as a means and therefore treating her as a means.

The second problem is that, as Derek Parfit has argued, harmfully using a person as a means does not entail treating that person as a mere means, or merely as a means. In the passage quoted, Frowe implicitly acknowledges that there can be a lesser-evil justification for the exploitative killing of an innocent bystander when that is necessary to save the lives of a sufficiently large number of other innocent people. A well-motivated moral agent who exploatively kills an innocent person in such conditions treats the victim as a means but not merely as a means, as the agent would not have killed the victim as a means of saving fewer innocent people. And he might accept substantial cost to himself if that is necessary for the victim to be killed painlessly rather than painfully. That shows that the agent is treating the innocent victim not merely as a means but also as an end, or as someone who herself matters.

Frowe’s claims about attitudes and treating people as mere means are not necessary to her argument and we can put them aside. Suppose that she is right that the exploitative killing of an innocent person is more seriously objectionable, when all else is equal, than the eliminative killing of an innocent person. It is this, she argues, that explains why it is in fact more seriously objectionable to kill an innocent bystander than it is to kill a nonresponsible threatener and thus shows that the Moral Equivalence Thesis is mistaken. And this in turn shows that, even though it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander in the course of defending one innocent person, it does not follow that it is also impermissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener in defense of one innocent person.

The reason she thinks that the greater wrongness of exploitative killing refutes the Moral Equivalence Thesis is that, on her view, whereas the killing of a nonresponsible threatener is not exploitative, the killing of an innocent bystander always is. Otsuka and I assumed, on the contrary, that while the defensive killing of a nonresponsible threatener is indeed eliminative, the killing of an innocent bystander need not be exploitative, but could also be either eliminative or “collateral” (that is, a side effect) of defensive action. I shared the assumption that the killing of an innocent bystander can be eliminative with Judith Thomson, who had presented an example of a person who, simply by virtue of his location,

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7 Ibid., p. 46. Compare pp. 52, 56, and 58, where there are further discussions of the idea that exploitative killing treats a person as a mere means.
8 Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume One, chapter 9, especially section 31 (pp. 221-28).
innocently obstructs a potential victim’s ability to escape from a lethal threat from a different source. Those who satisfy this description have come to be referred to as “innocent obstructors” in the literature but Thomson described this person as an innocent bystander.\(^9\) In later work, I borrowed Thomson’s example with the explicit aim of showing that one can kill an innocent bystander eliminatively. I claimed that, if an innocent obstructor were on a narrow public bridge that one needed to get across to escape from a murderer, one’s shaking the bridge to tumble the obstructor off, thereby causing her death, would constitute the eliminative killing of an innocent bystander. Intuitively, it would also be an impermissible killing. I then suggested that killing a nonresponsible threatener, which is also eliminative, is no less objectionable, and therefore also impermissible. I also claimed that if one simply ran onto the bridge, merely foreseeing that the obstructor would be shaken off, that might be an instance of killing an innocent bystander as a side effect.\(^{10}\) Otsuka’s argument explicitly uses an example of killing an innocent person as a side effect of defensive action, and he refers to the victim in this case as an innocent bystander.\(^{11}\)

Frowe argues, however, that these are not instances of killing an innocent bystander. She writes that “a bystander is a person whose actions, movements, or presence do not endanger Victim” (a name or label she uses throughout the book to refer to any potential victim of a threat).\(^{12}\) She plausibly contends that an innocent obstructor contributes to the threat to the potential victim, citing the case of a malicious obstructor whose causal role is identical. Obstructors, therefore, cannot be bystanders. Frowe also insists that it is a defining feature of a bystander that “her presence does not reduce the number of courses of defensive action morally available to Victim.”\(^{13}\) But anyone who would be harmed as a side effect of otherwise permissible defensive action is someone whose presence constitutes a moral reason not to engage in that action. While such a person is not a physical obstacle, she is what, following Gerhard Øverland, I will call a moral obstacle.\(^{14}\) According to Frowe, a moral obstacle contributes to a threat, albeit not causally, and thus cannot be a bystander. This clearly conflicts with ordinary usage, as people do say of innocent civilians in war (children, for example) who would be killed as a side effect of an otherwise permissible attack on a military target, that they are innocent bystanders rather than contributors to whatever threat the attack would be intended to avert. But we can ignore this, as our concerns are moral rather than linguistic.

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\(^{10}\) McMahan, *Killing in War*, p. 171.

\(^{11}\) Otsuka, p. 85.

\(^{12}\) Frowe, p. 22.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

Frowe does distinguish between what she calls “an indirect threat, ... a person who endangers Victim but who is not going to kill Victim” and a “direct threat,” who, if not prevented, “is going to kill Victim.”\(^\text{15}\) Innocent obstructors and moral obstacles are indirect threats – or, as I will say, “indirect threateners.” (Henceforth, unless otherwise indicated, all threateners, direct or indirect, should be understood to be innocent, and indeed nonresponsible. Moral obstacles may be necessarily innocent, and perhaps necessarily nonresponsible; for if a person is responsible or culpable for being where he will unavoidably be harmed as a side effect of otherwise justified defensive action, he is presumptively liable to be harmed as a side effect and thus does not constitute a moral impediment.)

As we will see, Frowe believes that the distinction between direct and indirect threateners is morally significant. But the important point for the moment is that, if a person can be harmed eliminatively, or would be harmed as a side effect by necessary defensive action, he is, in Frowe’s terms, a direct or indirect threatener and therefore cannot be an innocent bystander.

In this taxonomy, Frowe claims, “bystander killings are necessarily exploitative. ... But this wrongness can hardly be found in the killing of an innocent threat. Such a killing is eliminative.”\(^\text{16}\) Yet this may not be quite right. It seems that status as a bystander is relative to a threat, so that a person can be an innocent bystander relative to threat X, which is posed by someone else, and a nonresponsible threatener relative to threat Y, which he poses. Suppose that an agent kills this person intending to defend the potential victim of threat Y but foreseeing that doing so will also have the effect of eliminating threat X. This act of killing would be eliminative but would have an exploitative effect. We can, however, ignore this complication.

Whatever problems Frowe’s conceptual and taxonomical proposals might raise, the argument she builds on the definition of a bystander is that (1) all killings of innocent bystanders in the course of defensive action are necessarily exploitative, whereas (2) killings of nonresponsible threateners are eliminative (or collateral, though she does not say this), and (3) because killing an innocent person exploitatively is more seriously objectionable than killing an innocent person eliminatively, (4) the Moral Equivalence Thesis is therefore false and “Otsuka’s argument that the killing of an innocent threat can be morally assimilated to the killing of a bystander is mistaken.”\(^\text{17}\) This leaves it open that it can be permissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener in defense of a single person even though it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander to preserve the life of a single person.

This argument, I believe, misses its target, as it is concerned only with how we might or should use words. The substance of Otsuka’s argument can be restated in Frowe’s terms without losing any of its force in the translation. Here is a suggested reformulation of the basic argument. It differs from Otsuka’s original argument in certain ways that I think strengthen it. Most notably, unlike the original argument, it makes no reference to innocent bystanders in Frowe’s sense. Otsuka not only stated his initial premise with reference to bystanders but

\(^{15}\) Frowe, p. 22.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 8.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
also illustrated it with an instance of exploitative killing. This, I now think, was a mistake. Innocent bystanders in Frowe’s sense are irrelevant to the argument that he and I were attempting to develop.

The first premise in that argument is that the eliminative killing of an indirect threatener, such as a nonresponsible obstructor, is normally impermissible as a means of defending only a single person, as is the killing of a moral obstacle as a side effect of defending the life of only one person. (One might include a proviso that the harm of death to the indirect threatener would not be slight, or very substantially less than the harm of death to the person who might be defended.) That Otsuka and I earlier referred to such indirect threateners as innocent bystanders makes no difference to the intuition that it is impermissible to kill them. Indeed, Frowe herself accepts the claim of this premise, just as she accepts the corresponding premise of Otsuka’s original argument, provided that the concept of an innocent bystander as it appears there is understood in her sense. Yet, understood in her way, the first premise of the original argument is quite different in substance from the first premise of this revised and restated argument.

The second premise is that there is no difference between the eliminative killing of a direct threatener and either the eliminative or collateral killing of an indirect threatener that makes killing a direct threatener less morally objectionable or easier to justify than killing an indirect threatener. The conclusion of the argument is then that the killing of a direct threatener in defense of a single victim is normally impermissible.

One can, I think, defend an even stronger position. The claim of the restated argument is that the killing of a direct threatener is impermissible because it is no less seriously wrong than the killing of an indirect threatener, which is impermissible. But it is reasonable to believe that the killing of a direct threatener is actually more seriously wrong than the killing of at least certain indirect threateners whom it is impermissible to kill – namely, moral obstacles. For the killing of a moral obstacle is an unintended side effect of defensive action, whereas the killing of a direct threatener is an instance of intended killing as a means. And according to traditional deontological ethics, the harmful killing of an innocent person as an intended means is more seriously objectionable, and harder to justify, than the equally harmful killing of an innocent person that occurs as an unintended side effect.

Otsuka makes a similar point but here I believe that he overreaches. He notes that the defensive killing of a direct threatener involves killing the threatener as an intended means. But, failing to distinguish between the exploitative and eliminative forms of killing as a means, he assimilates the latter to the former in claiming that killing a direct threatener is “analogous to those most deplorable cases in which you kill a Bystander in order to eat her body to prevent yourself from starving or in order to replace your failing vital organs with her healthy ones.”18 These, however, are instances of the exploitative killing of an innocent person, which, as we have seen, Frowe and many other nonconsequentialists believe to be more objectionable, and harder to justify, than the equally intentional eliminative killing of an innocent person.

18 Otsuka, p. 87.
One might object to the claim that intentional eliminative killing is more objectionable than killing as a side effect by observing that the common sense intuition seems to be that killing an innocent person as a side effect of defensive action is normally impermissible while killing a nonresponsible threatener is normally permissible. I believe, however, that the intuitive tendency, which I share, to think that killing a nonresponsible threatener is permissible is the result of subconscious overgeneralizing of beliefs about the permissibility of self-defense in ordinary cases involving culpable threateners. I will return to this later.

Frowe explicitly rejects the second premise of this restated argument, claiming that a direct threatener has an enforceable duty to bear costs to avoid killing an innocent person that is stronger than any corresponding duty that an indirect threatener might have. I will examine her argument in Section 4 and offer a defense of the second premise in Section 5.

3 Frowe’s Intuitive Argument
I noted in Section 1 that in addition to her critique of Otsuka’s argument, Frowe presents a series of considerations that she believes support the permissibility of killing direct threateners. These can be separated into two categories, intuitive and theoretical.

Frowe’s intuitive argument begins with a hypothetical example that first appeared in Nozick’s *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* and has subsequently been discussed by Judith Jarvis Thomson and many others. Frowe calls it

*Ray Gun*  Falling Person is blown by wind down a well at the bottom of which Victim is trapped. Falling Person will crush Victim to death unless Victim vaporizes her with his ray gun. If he does not vaporize her, Victim will cushion Falling Person’s landing, saving her life.  

This is intended to be a paradigm case of a direct threatener. It is intuitive that Victim may permissibly kill Falling Person in self-defense. But, just as Otsuka and I sought to challenge that intuition by presenting cases that we claimed were no different morally but in which killing is impersonal, so Frowe seeks to reinforce the intuition by presenting cases that she claims are no different morally but in which it is even more obvious that killing is permissible. Yet, just as she argues that our cases are not relevantly similar, so I will argue that hers are not either.

Frowe cites four further examples of the same type of situation.

*Spacious Well*  If Victim remains stationary, he will be crushed and Falling Person will survive. If he moves aside, he will survive but she will be killed.

*Stationary Shield*  If Victim remains on top of a shield, he will be killed and Falling Person will survive. If he gets underneath the shield, he will survive but she will be killed.

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19 This statement of the example is from Frowe, p. 22. Also see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 34-35. The details of Thomson’s version are different – for example, Falling Person is caused by a villain to fall toward Victim – but the relations among the persons involved are meant to be the same. See “Self-Defense,” pp. 287ff.
**Existing Shield** Victim is underneath a shield. If he removes it, he will be killed and Falling Person will survive. If he leaves it in place, he will survive but she will be killed.

**Flagpole** Victim is holding a flagpole upright. If he lowers it, he will be killed and Falling Person will survive. If he keeps it in place, he will survive but she will be killed.

Frowe cites with approval an analysis of the concept of killing given by Otsuka according to which killing consists in “the initiation or sustaining of, or the insertion of somebody into, a sequence of events that results in the death of a person.” Following Otsuka, she claims that Victim’s action in Flagpole “is a killing because, in continuing to hold the flagpole, Victim sustains a sequence of events that results in the death of Falling Person. … But of course, Flagpole is just Existing Shield with a different object. If Flagpole is a killing, so too is Existing Shield.” Finally, she claims that Victim’s moving aside in Spacious Well is also an instance of killing, for it “initiates a sequence of events of which Falling Person’s death is an upshot, since he initiates moving out of her path when so moving will result in her death.”

Frowe’s point here seems to be that, because it is obviously permissible for Victim to move aside in Spacious Well, and because no morally significant differences are introduced in the sequence of cases between Spacious Well and Ray Gun, it must be permissible for Victim to kill Falling Person in the latter case as well.

Frowe considers the objection that “this just shows that Otsuka’s account of what it is for something to be a killing needs revising,” but she rejects this suggestion on two grounds. The first is that “Otsuka is correct that intentionally sustaining a lethal sequence of events falls on the killing side of the killing/letting die distinction. Even if Victim does not take up the flagpole with lethal intent, his continuing to hold the flagpole renders his action more than a letting die.”

Frowe appears to assume that if Victim intends that Falling Person should die, he must intend to kill her. But an agent’s intention is irrelevant to whether his act is a killing or an instance of letting a person die; for one can intend to allow a person to die, which is in fact what Victim does in Flagpole. To show this, it may help to borrow a strategy from Frowe. To make her case that obstructors and moral obstacles are threateners, she seeks to elicit our intuitions in cases in which these people intentionally and culpably act as obstructors or obstacles. We can similarly suppose that Falling Person has intentionally and maliciously thrown herself from a height intending to crush Victim without injuring herself. But she failed to perceive that he was holding up a flagpole. In this case, if Victim knows what Falling Person has done and fails to lower the flagpole, he simply fails to save her by making himself into a cushion for her, and she then

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20 Frowe, pp. 64-67. These are my own statements of the examples. Flagpole is taken from Otsuka, p. 89.
21 Frowe, p. 65.
22 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
23 Ibid., p. 66.
impales herself on his flagpole. This is even clearer if Victim does not see her descending toward him. In this case he does not kill her, but neither does he allow her to die, as one can allow a person to die only if one is aware that one can save her. One can, of course, kill a person without knowing one is doing so. And this is indeed a case of accidental killing, not because Victim kills Falling Person but because Falling Person accidentally kills herself.

Similar remarks apply to Frowe’s three other cases. As she rightly notes, Existing Shield is exactly like Flagpole except that Victim is protected by a different object. So that too is a case of letting Falling Person die. That Victim’s action is not a killing is most obvious in Spacious Well. Imagine a variant of that case in which Victim is initially away from where Falling Person will land. If he does not move, he will clearly allow her to die. But suppose that he decides to save her and moves underneath her, then changes his mind and moves back to where he was, so that she hits the ground and dies. He does not kill her but initiates action to save her but before the action becomes effective withdraws what would have saved her and thus allows her to die.\(^{25}\) Yet once Victim has positioned himself where Falling Person will land, this case is from then on exactly like Spacious Well. In that case too Victim refuses to save Falling Person by providing his body as a cushion for her. Again, this is even more obvious if we suppose that Falling Person has maliciously hurled herself at him. In that case, although she attempts to kill him, she accidentally kills herself instead by throwing herself down a well in the mistaken belief that he, or his body, would save her.

It is revealing that in a couple of passages Frowe herself describes Victim’s action in cases of this sort as a failure to save. She writes that “those who oppose a permission to kill innocent threats must resist a requirement for Victim to rescue innocent threats [such as Falling Person] at the cost of his own life.”\(^{26}\) This presupposes that in the four cases that are supposed to be morally just like Ray Gun, Victim fails to rescue Falling Person. And this implies that he does not kill her, as it would be absurd to describe an act of killing as a failure to rescue one’s victim from being killed by oneself. (There are, admittedly, cases in which one kills a person as a means of preventing her from saving herself at the expense of one’s own life. If you and I both need a respirator to survive and I shoot you to prevent you from stealing mine, I both kill you and prevent you from saving yourself. I think that Ray Gun is also a case of this sort. But these are not best understood as cases in which one both kills a person and allows that person to die; for preventing a person from being saved is arguably different both conceptually and morally from allowing a person to die.\(^{27}\))

Frowe’s second response to the objection that the analysis of killing that she and Otsuka accept is mistaken is that

It doesn’t matter whether, for example, holding the flagpole is a killing but moving the shield over oneself is a letting die. What matters is whether it is plausible to grant Victim a permission to

\(^{25}\) For elucidation and defense of this claim, see Jeff McMahan, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid,” *Ethics* 103 (1993): 250-79.

\(^{26}\) Frowe, p. 71. She makes the same claim on p. 66.

move the shield over himself, or move himself under the shield, but
deny him a permission to continue to hold the flagpole. And I
don’t see how it can be plausible, because picking up a lethal object –
which is what the shield is – looks more like a killing than does
merely continuing to hold the flagpole. This response, however, misses the force of the objection, which is that the four additional cases do nothing to show that disintegrating Falling Person in Ray Gun is permissible because disintegrating her is an instance of killing a direct threatener, whereas the other four cases are instances of allowing a direct threatener to die. And one may think that Victim’s action in these four cases is permissible precisely because they are instances of allowing an innocent, nonresponsible person to die rather than instances of killing an innocent, nonresponsible person.

As I indicated earlier, I accept that in these four cases, Victim allows Falling Person to die intentionally, as a means of saving his own life. Yet, like intentionally killing a person, intentionally letting a person can be either eliminative or exploitative. In the four cases, Victim’s allowing Falling Person to die is eliminative and thus does not involve harmfully using her as a means. If Victim were to allow an innocent person to die exploitatively – for example, in order that her organ could be transplanted into his body – that would presumably be impermissible.

4 Frowe’s Theoretical Argument

After advancing her intuitive argument that appeals to the four cases, Frowe develops a more theoretical argument with a number of elements to it. Here I will attempt to summarize that argument and to distinguish its different elements. Immediately after stating her points 3 and 5, I will briefly register my skepticism about each but will not pursue the matter in depth. After stating all the elements of the argument, I will advance some larger objections.

(1) Unless prevented from doing so, a direct threatener will directly harm or kill Victim. Frowe often adds that the direct threatener will do this by interfering with Victim’s body. As it is not clear to me why that feature of the killing is significant, I will ignore it.

(2) Because a direct threatener will otherwise kill Victim, defensive agency directed against her is eliminative and therefore does not involve harmfully using her. But this is not, as Frowe acknowledges, sufficient for the act of killing to be permissible. (The killing of a nonresponsible obstructor is not exploitative either, but Frowe claims that it is impermissible to kill an indirect threatener unless she is morally responsible for her contribution to a threat.) That the mode of agency in killing a direct threatener is not exploitative shows only that one possible objection to an act of killing does not apply in this case.

(3) We have a duty not to kill and also a secondary duty to “bear greater costs to avoid killing (or directly harming) people than to avoid endangering them in other [that is, indirect] ways.” This is the basis of Frowe’s claim that there is a morally significant difference between a direct threatener and an

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28 Frowe, p. 66.
29 Frowe, pp. 78-79.
indirect threatener, and hence of her rejection of the second premise in my revised restatement of Otsuka’s original argument.

Frowe here appeals to the view, introduced by Frances Kamm and later developed by Victor Tadros, that if, for example, Falling Person could alter her trajectory so that she would not crush Victim, she would have a duty to do that, at a proportionate cost.30 Kamm thinks, however, that she is not required to bear a lethal cost to do so.31 Frowe agrees in cases in which a direct threatener, such as Falling Person, does not intend the threat she poses. But she claims that when a nonresponsible threatener “has intentionally caused herself to threaten, … her duty to prevent herself from killing Victim requires her to bear lethal costs.”32

I simply note here that I see no reason why a threatener’s intention should have so much significance, or indeed any significance at all, if she is in no way responsible for having it. A person’s intentions have no more moral significance than the movements of her body have if she is not in any degree responsible for either.

(4) The duty to bear costs to avoid killing an innocent person is enforceable by the threatened person and by third parties. Assuming that Falling Person can do nothing to avoid killing Victim, Victim or a third party is permitted to engage in defensive action that imposes costs on Falling Person up to those she would be required to impose on herself to prevent herself from landing on Victim.

(5) Part of the explanation of why we have this enforceable duty not to kill, even nonresponsibly, is that we are responsible for whatever our bodies cause to occur. Here Frowe quotes Victor Tadros, who writes that “it is the fact that I am responsible for what my body does, even when it is not a product of my agency, that gives rise to the permission to harm innocent attackers and innocent threats. And I bear that responsibility because my body is me.”33

It is unclear, however, how one could bear no responsibility for the threat one’s body poses, as Frowe says of Falling Person, and yet simultaneously be “responsible for what [one’s] body does,” as she follows Tadros in claiming is also true of Falling Person. Perhaps what she means is that, although a nonresponsible threatener has no control over the threat her body poses, she is nonetheless picked out as the one to whom the harms it causes must ultimately be distributed, in much the way that a military officer might be required to bear costs, either as punishment or as compensation to victims, for harms wrongly inflicted by one of her soldiers over whose wrongful acts she could not have exercised any control. In most such cases, however, the officer is held responsible on the ground that there really was something she failed to do in the past that might have motivated the soldier not to act has he did, or perhaps something she did that might have motivated him to act in that way. But in this

31 Kamm, Creation and Abortion, p. 48.
32 Frowe, p. 83.
33 Frowe, p. 68; Tadros, p. 255.
respect there is no parallel with the relation between Falling Person and her body, as we are assuming that there was nothing she could have done to prevent her body from becoming a threat. In other cases, an officer may be held accountable for purely instrumental reasons, such as to provide other officers with an incentive to exert as much control as possible over their soldiers. But again there is no parallel with Falling Person and other similar direct threateners, for part of what it is to be a nonresponsible threatener is that there is nothing one could reasonably have been expected to do to avoid becoming one. If one could have avoided becoming a threatener by taking reasonable precautions, one is to some extent responsible for having become one.

(6) In cases in which a direct threatener has an enforceable duty to bear only less than lethal harm, it can still be permissible for Victim or a third party to kill her. This is because the greater part of the harm in the direct threatener’s being killed can be justified on the ground that she has a duty to bear it, while the remaining part can be justified because her suffering it is the lesser evil – that is, substantially less bad than Victim’s being killed by her.

In presenting this multi-faceted argument, Frowe claims that a direct threatener’s having an enforceable duty to bear defensive harm is not equivalent to her being liable to be harmed. “She is,” Frowe contends, “not liable to defensive harm—she hasn’t forfeited her rights. But she nonetheless lacks a right not to be harmed because in harming her...Victim imposes only costs that she has a duty to bear.” This is a subtle distinction. For simplicity of exposition, assume that the harm that the direct lethal threatener has a duty to bear is the harm of being killed. Frowe affirms that the threatener lacks a right not to be killed. Yet she had this right before she began to pose a lethal threat. The claim that by posing the threat she acquires an enforceable duty to bear a lethal harm entails that by posing that threat she loses her right not to be killed; for it makes no sense to suppose that she has a right against the justified enforcement of her enforceable duty. But losing that right seems no different in substance from forfeiting it, which is what it is to become liable to be killed (unless the forfeiture is a corollary of deserving to be killed, which I will assume it is not).

Yet duty and liability are not strictly correlative. While all those who are liable to suffer a certain harm have a duty to bear it, not all those who have a duty to bear a harm are liable to suffer it. For example, a person who happens by chance to be where an accident occurs can acquire a duty to allow herself to be harmed as a means or side effect of the rescuing of the victim without being liable to be harmed in that way. We might say that this person, who in Frowe’s taxonomy is either an innocent bystander or a moral obstacle, loses her right not to have costs imposed on her but does not forfeit it, whereas a threatener who is liable to defensive harm does forfeit her right not to suffer that harm.

The question is whether the reason why a person acquires a duty and loses a right by becoming a direct threatener is relevantly similar to or different from the reason why the person at the accident acquires a duty and loses a right. It seems that Frowe should think that these reasons are different. This is because she thinks that the strengths of the two duties are different.

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34 Frowe, pp. 83-84.
The duty to bear costs in the rescue of an accident victim is grounded in those costs’ being the lesser evil – that is, the harm the person has a duty to incur in the saving of the victim is substantially less severe than that which would thereby be prevented. Yet Frowe believes that the harm that a direct threatener has a duty to bear to avoid killing an innocent victim is substantially greater than that which the person at the accident is required to bear in the saving of a life. Otherwise there would be no difference in strength between the duty to prevent one’s own body from killing an innocent person and the duty to prevent someone else’s body, or some other object, from doing so. This is why a direct threatener’s supposed duty to bear costs necessary to prevent her from killing an innocent person should, for Frowe, be correlative with liability rather than being like a person’s duty to suffer harm in the saving of an accident victim.

Yet Frowe believes, rightly in my view, that responsibility is necessary for liability. She thus contends that one’s becoming a nonresponsible threatener does not make one liable to defensive harm. I believe, similarly, that one’s becoming a nonresponsible threatener does not generate an enforceable duty to bear harm that is as great as that which one would be required to bear if one were liable defensive harm. Nor does it generate an enforceable duty to bear harm that is as great as Frowe thinks it is. Someone who has become a direct threatener without being responsible for doing so does of course have a duty, if possible, to bear some costs to prevent herself from killing an innocent victim. But the harm she has a duty to bear is, I believe, no greater than that which an innocent, uninvolved person would have a duty to bear if by bearing it she could otherwise harmlessly prevent a direct threatener from killing an innocent victim. In short, if a direct threatener has a duty to bear harm to prevent herself from otherwise nonresponsibly killing an innocent person, it is because her bearing that harm is the lesser evil in the circumstances. There is, I believe, no basis for a duty to bear harm that lies between a duty to suffer the lesser evil and a duty that is correlative with liability.

It will help at this point to distinguish among the different types of duty a threatener or potential threatener might have. The basic duty is not to engage in voluntary action for which one is morally responsible that will kill an innocent person without justification. But our concern is with duties that apply to or are possessed by those who threaten innocent people nonresponsibly. There is, of course, a duty to take reasonable precautions against becoming a nonresponsible threatener – for example, in the case of Falling Person, a duty, if possible, to resist being captured and used as an instrument for the killing of another. And like many other duties, this duty may entail a secondary duty to bear costs that are necessary for fulfilling it. But again, both these duties are those of morally responsible agents.

Third, as Kamm and Tadros have noted, there seems to be a duty to try to avoid killing an innocent person, and to bear necessary costs in doing so, even after one has become a direct threatener – for example, after one’s body has been hurled at another. Again, if Falling Person could alter her trajectory so that she could avoid killing Victim without incurring an unreasonably high cost, she would have a duty to do that.

Yet if someone with the capacity for morally responsible agency poses a direct threat to the life of another innocent person and has the option of preventing herself from killing that person, she is not a nonresponsible
threatener, even if she is not responsible for having become a threat. Suppose, for example, that Falling Person has been hurled at Victim but can avoid killing him and ought to bear the costs necessary to do so. Yet again, this is a duty that applies to her as a morally responsible agent. But suppose she refuses to bear those costs and continues the threaten him. In that case, her wrongful action makes her liable to defensive action that may inflict on her not only the harm she was morally required to bear but also additional harms that may have become necessary and that are also proportionate (taking into account that the amount of harm it is proportionate to inflict on her has increased as a result of her wrongdoing). She becomes liable because she is responsible for allowing herself to threaten Victim without justification.

None of the duties I have cited is a duty of a nonresponsible threatener. Suppose that Falling Person lacks any ability, either before or after she is hurled down the well, to avoid killing Victim and that she does indeed land on him and kill him. She has not violated any duty. In killing Victim, she has not done or willed or even intended anything. There cannot, moreover, be a duty not to kill an innocent person wholly involuntarily and nonresponsibly. There cannot, for example, be a duty not to be hurled involuntarily against another innocent person (though, as noted, there can be a duty to resist being used in this way). This is an implication of the claim that “ought” implies “can.”

This raises the question of what duty would be enforced if Victim or a third party were to disintegrate Falling Person as she descends. I have claimed that it cannot be a duty that she actually has and will otherwise violate. Perhaps it is a duty that she would have if she were not a nonresponsible threatener, such as the duty not to do what would kill Victim or the duty to prevent herself from killing Victim, even at some personal cost. But because those are not duties that she violates by being hurled involuntarily at Victim, it seems that they are not duties that can be enforced by killing her. That is, she cannot be made to comply with such duties by being killed if they are not duties that, in the circumstances, she actually has.

Let us assume, however, that I am wrong about this and that if Victim or a third party kills Falling Person, he or they would be enforcing Falling Person’s duty not to kill Victim. As my brief summary of Frowe’s argument indicates, she follows Kamm in accepting that Falling Person does not have a duty to bear lethal defensive harm. The question thus arises of how much harm Falling Person has a duty to bear, if necessary, to prevent her body from killing Victim when she bears no moral responsibility for the threat it poses to him. As I mentioned, Kamm and Frowe believe that the maximum harm that Falling Person might have a duty to bear is greater than that which she might have a duty to bear to prevent someone else’s body, or some other threatening object, from killing an innocent person. This is because they believe that the duty to prevent one’s own body from harming an innocent person is stronger than the duty to prevent another body or object from causing equivalent harm to that same person. For

35 Tadros has subsequently changed his view and now accepts that it is in general impermissible to kill a nonresponsible threatener. His new position is defended in an as-yet-unpublished manuscript called “Why it is Wrong to Kill Non-Responsible Threats.”
Kamm the explanation of this is that if one’s body threatens the life of another, one is “in an inappropriate relation to the other person.” For Frowe, as we have seen, it is that one has a special responsibility for one’s body because one is one’s body.

I believe that the claim that we are our bodies, in the sense of being numerically identical to them, is false as a matter of metaphysics. But I have argued for this elsewhere and will not rehearse those arguments here. I will instead attempt to probe our intuitions about whether the reason one has to prevent one’s own body from causing harm when one is not morally responsible for the threat it poses is stronger than the reason to prevent someone else’s body, for which one is also not responsible, from causing equivalent harm.

Here are four examples intended to elicit intuitions about the comparative importance of preventing one’s own body from killing an innocent person.

**Equal Harm** A stranger and I have both been captured by Villain, who has already rendered the stranger unconscious and is about to anesthetize me as well. But first he offers me a choice. Either he will drop my unconscious body on Victim 1, thereby killing him, or, if I provide Villain with some benefit at substantial personal cost, he will drop the stranger’s unconscious body on a different innocent person, Victim 2. There are no relevant differences between Victims 1 and 2 and, as in all such cases, neither the stranger nor I will be harmed.

**Lesser Harm** Either Villain will drop my unconscious body on Victim 1, causing him harm almost but not quite as bad as the harm involved in being killed, or, if I provide him with the benefit, he will drop the stranger’s unconscious body on Victim 2, thereby killing him.

**Brainless Killing 1** I live in a technologically advanced society in which people’s lives can be extended for hundreds of years. In this society, people periodically have their brains temporarily removed from their bodies so that their bodies can be furnished with new organs grown from stem cells. During this process, a person’s brain is able to communicate with other people. I see that some stranger’s body from which the brain has temporarily been removed is about to be dropped by Villain on Victim, with the usual consequences. I can, however, prevent the stranger’s body from being dropped if I bear some cost. Suppose that the maximum cost I am morally required to bear to prevent this killing is x.

Brainless Killing 2 My brain has been removed while my body is in the shop for service. I learn that Villain has abducted my body and is about to drop it on Victim. If, however, I agree to bear a certain cost, I can prevent that.

In thinking about these cases, I feel a slight inclination to think that I ought to bear the cost in Equal Harm and Lesser Harm and that I ought to bear a cost greater than $x$ in Brainless Killing 2 to prevent my own body from being used to kill Victim. But on reflection I think this is just a product of a certain squeamishness about being causally involved in a killing. It is rather like the feeling of relief that one of my students once told me he had experienced when his family’s dog died on the way to the veterinarian’s office where she was to be euthanized. Even though the student knew that it would be good for the dog to die, he was deeply averse to being causally involved in her being killed. In much the same way, I might be motivated to ensure that it is the stranger’s body that kills an innocent person rather than my own, but not because I believe that I ought to. Indeed, I think that in Lesser Harm I ought not to bear the cost required to induce Villain to drop the stranger’s body rather than mine.

In summary, a nonresponsible threatener cannot have a duty not to kill an innocent person involuntarily and nonresponsibly. A fortiori, she cannot have a secondary duty to bear harm in the fulfillment of such a duty; nor can her potential victim or third parties have a permission to harm her as a means or side effect of enforcing such a duty – that is, one that she does not have. And even if a nonresponsible threatener could acquire a duty by posing a direct threat, it would not derive from her special relation to her body.

I will conclude this section by presenting three further objections to Frowe’s argument for the permissibility of killing direct threateners. The first concerns point 6 above. Frowe accepts that a direct threatener who does not intend the threat she poses is not morally required to sacrifice her life to prevent herself from killing Victim. Her enforceable duty is to bear only some lesser, nonlethal harm. Yet Frowe claims that it is still permissible to kill her. This is because she thinks that most of the harm the threatener would suffer in being killed is harm that she has a duty to bear. If we then compare the remainder of the harm in being killed – the difference between the amount of harm she has a duty to bear and the full harm of death – we find that it is so much less than the full harm of death for Victim, that Victim or a third party is justified in inflicting it on the ground that it is the lesser evil. Frowe calls the full justification a “hybrid justification” because it combines two forms of justification for harming: a duty-based justification and a lesser-evil justification.

If, however, I am right that the harm that a direct threatener (who, again, I am assuming is nonresponsible) has a duty to bear to prevent herself from killing Victim is no greater than that which a nonresponsible nonthreatener would have a duty to bear as a side effect of Victim’s being prevented from being killed, then the hybrid justification can succeed only in cases in which the harm the threatener would suffer in dying is substantially less than that which Victim would suffer, for example because of a great difference in age. (I say “as a side effect” because that is generally thought to be a less objectionable mode of agency than the intentional, eliminative agency by which the threatener would be harmed. And the harm one has a duty to bear via a less objectionable mode of agency should, if anything, be greater than that one would have a duty to bear
via a more objectionable mode of agency.) Assuming that the amount of harm that a nonresponsible nonthreatener has a duty to bear as a side effect of the saving an innocent person is small in relation to the harm of being killed, the difference in magnitude between that harm and the full harm of death is too great for its infliction to be justified as the lesser evil when the alternative is allowing Victim to be killed.

The second objection is that Frowe’s argument has what I believe to be a seriously counterintuitive implication. In another version of the dry well case, Third Party Intervention Villain has forcibly captured both Victim and Falling Person and rendered them both unconscious. He has placed Victim at the bottom of the well and is about to throw Falling Person down, again with the usual consequences. Because they are both unconscious, neither Victim nor Falling Person can do anything to prevent Victim from being killed. There is, however, an unrelated, disinterested person, Third Party, who has a weapon that he can use, at no cost to himself, to disintegrate Falling Person, though he cannot use it to kill Villain, who is screened from him.

According to Frowe, there is a hybrid justification for killing Falling Person, both elements of which extend to Third Party. Falling Person has an enforceable duty to bear most of the harm of death and Third Party can, at no cost to himself, enforce that duty; therefore he ought to do so. There is also a lesser-evil justification for inflicting the remainder of the harm of death on Falling Person and Frowe believes that agents are required and not merely permitted to act on lesser-evil justifications; hence Third Party ought to inflict the remaining part of the harm of death as well. That is, he is morally required to kill Falling Person. Yet Third Party has a choice between intentionally killing an innocent, nonresponsible person as a means (albeit an eliminative means) of saving the life of another innocent, nonresponsible person, and unintentionally allowing the second of these people to be killed. Intuitively, and according to widely accepted deontological principles, it seems that Third Party’s intervention to kill Falling Person is not only not morally required but is in fact morally prohibited.

The third objection is less serious but worth considering. As I have noted, when attempting to show that it is permissible to kill a direct threatener in defense of a single victim, Frowe claims that it is significant that the threatener “is going to harmfully interfere with an innocent person’s body” and that, “since averting such interference requires only non-exploitative, eliminative force, it is permissible for a morally innocent person to use proportionate force to prevent such harmful interference.” Both these observations, however, apply as well to Victim’s attempt to kill Falling Person in self-defense. Together they suggest that if Falling Person could act preemptively to kill Victim in counter-defense, she would be permitted to do so.

Frowe will of course respond that the cases are different because Victim is acting permissibly and thus does not have an enforceable duty not to kill Falling

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Person. It seems, however, that the only reason, on Frowe’s view, that Victim’s
defensive action is permissible while Falling Person’s is not is simply that Falling
Person threatened first. Kamm explicitly says this difference is morally
significant. She writes that a nonresponsible threatener “is in a position where
she should not be first. … She should bear a relatively greater burden for
correcting this inappropriate position.” It seems to me, however, that this
difference in timing is morally insignificant given that Falling Person is no more
responsible for threatening first than she is for threatening. Indeed, if there is a
morally significant difference, it is that Victim threatens as a morally responsible
agent whereas Falling Person does not.

5 Further Intuitive Arguments Against the Permissibility of Killing
Nonresponsible Threateners

There is another way in which, on Frowe’s view, whether it is permissible to
kill a nonresponsible person who causes a lethal threat is a matter of timing.
Suppose that, in

Reparation 1 Villain throws unconscious Falling Person down a
well at the bottom of which lies unconscious Victim. Falling
Person’s landing on Victim does not kill him but does irreversibly
damage one of his vital organs. Her having landed on him will kill
him soon unless he receives an organ transplant. Third Party
arrives moments later. He is of course a transplant surgeon who
quickly determines that Falling Person, who is uninjured but still
unconscious, has a tissue type that makes her an ideal source of a
replacement organ for Victim, who is also still unconscious. He can
perform the surgery, killing Falling Person but saving Victim.

On Frowe’s view, if Third Party had arrived moments earlier, he would have
been permitted (indeed, if my second objection above is correct, required) to kill
Falling Person as she descended. At that point, she was a direct threatener who
could have been killed eliminatively. But she is now what I once referred to as
an “innocent cause” of a threat, though here it is better to give her the narrower
label, “nonresponsible cause.” Although she caused the threat to Victim’s life
and will have killed him if she is not killed now, she is also, in Frowe’s taxonomy,
an innocent bystander who must be killed exploitatively if Victim is to be saved
from the threat she has caused. So, on Frowe’s view, although Third Party
would have been required to kill Falling Person to save Victim if he had arrived
moments earlier, it is now impermissible for him to kill her to save Victim.

I do not deny that many people – probably most – would accept that it
would have been permissible for Third Party to kill Falling Person as she
descended to prevent her from killing Victim by damaging his vital organ, but
not permissible for him to kill her after she has damaged the organ, even though
in both instances he would kill her as a means of preventing her from killing

40 Kamm, Creation and Abortion, p. 47.
Both in this article and in The Ethics of Killing (pp.405-407), I have used the
comparison between a nonresponsible cause and a direct threatener to argue
that it is normally impermissible to kill a direct threatener. Here I try to take
the argument further.
Victim. But I do question whether these intuitions are rationally defensible. In this case, the difference between eliminative and exploitative agency is a matter of timing. If the defensive killing is done just before Falling Person’s body causes the immediate threat to Victim’s life, it is eliminative; if it is done just after, it is exploitative.

It may be instructive to compare Reparation 1 with

Reparation 2 Villain is maliciously attempting to kill Victim by driving a car into him. Although Villain’s car strikes Victim, it does not kill him but does irreparably damage one of his vital organs. The car then swerves into a tree, knocking Villain unconscious. Third Party, who again is a transplant surgeon, can save Victim but only by replacing Victim’s damaged organ with Villain’s healthy one.  

While he was driving toward Victim, Villain was a culpable direct threatener. But when his car struck Victim, he immediately became a bystander. (Because he is culpably responsible for the threat to Victim’s life, he is a culpable bystander. He is thus a counterexample to Frowe’s claim that “the idea of a morally responsible bystander” is “conceptually incoherent,” for “there is ... nothing with respect to the threat to Victim for which a bystander can be morally responsible.”) It is uncontroversial that while Villain was driving his car toward Victim, he was morally liable to be killed, assuming that killing him was necessary to prevent him from hitting Victim. Thus, if Third Party had been present then and had had the capacity to kill Villain at no cost to himself, he would have been justified in killing him and probably morally required to do so. He has, however, arrived too late to defend Victim eliminatively. But he can still prevent Villain’s wrongful action from killing Victim. To me it seems implausible to suppose that Villain can escape liability to be killed just because Third Party has arrived a moment later rather than a moment earlier, so that he must now kill Villain exploitatively rather than eliminatively to prevent Villain from killing, or having killed, Victim. Although I share the intuition that it seems worse to kill Villain exploitatively, I think that intuition is mistaken. On reflection, I think that, because Villain is culpably responsible for the situation in

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42 I briefly discussed the challenges that a case of this sort raises in “Justice and Liability in Organ Allocation,” Social Research 74 (2007): 101-124, pp. 111-13, though without at the time appreciating the possible significance of the distinction between eliminative and exploitative agency.

43 Ibid., pp. 29 and 28. Another counterexample is a person who culpably allows a threat for which he is neither causally nor morally responsible to eventuate in harm when he ought to prevent that. Frowe argues (pp. 29-30) that such a person is not a counterexample because, although he is culpable, he is not culpable for the existence of the threat and is “not culpable qua bystander.” I think that, even if his allowing the threat to continue does not cause the threat to continue, he is nevertheless morally culpable for its continuation. And he is a bystander when he allows it to continue, as he would have to be harmed exploitatively to make him fulfill his duty to eliminate the threat. (There is no suggestion in Frowe’s example that he might be a moral obstacle rather than a bystander.)
which either he or Victim must die, it is a matter of justice that he should bear the burden of his own wrongdoing, even if that requires that he be killed exploitatively.

Reparation 1 and Reparation 2 have the same structure. In each, a person is initially a direct threatener (in one case a nonresponsible direct threatener, in the other a culpable direct threatener) but, having caused a soon-to-be-fatal injury, then becomes a bystander who is also the cause of a present threat (in one case a nonresponsible cause, in the other a culpable cause). In Reparation 2 I find it difficult to believe that Third Party could be morally required to kill Villain as he drives towards Victim but morally forbidden to kill him a moment later, when in both instances killing him is necessary to prevent his wrongful action from killing Victim. Because I think it clear that Third Party is required to kill Villain eliminatively as he is driving towards Victim, I conclude that he is permitted to kill him exploitatively shortly thereafter.

Because the cases are structurally identical, I think that, in Reparation 1, the two ways in which Third Party might kill Falling Person in defense of Victim should also be either both permissible or both impermissible. Because I think it clear that Third Party may not kill Falling Person exploitatively when she has become a nonresponsible cause and thus an innocent bystander, I conclude that he would not have been permitted to kill her eliminatively if he had been present while she was falling. As Falling Person is a paradigm instance of a nonresponsible direct threatener, this suggests that it is normally impermissible to kill such a person in defense of a single victim.

I will conclude by presenting one more pair of examples. Like the preceding argument, and like Otsuka’s original argument and Frowe’s argument that appeals to cases involving a flagpole, a shield, and so on, it takes the form of a comparison between a case of involving a direct threatener and another case that is intended to be morally indistinguishable. These final two examples together challenge the moral significance of one of the considerations that Frowe thinks is particularly important – namely, the distinction between a direct and an indirect threatener.

Duress 1 Villain captures and sedates an innocent person, Unconscious Victim, whose death he desires. He also captures Victim, whom he wants to coerce to kill an innocent person. He puts a gun to Victim’s head and orders him to kill Unconscious Victim. Victim believes, correctly, that it is certain that he will be killed if he refuses. He cannot use the means he has for killing Unconscious Victim to kill Threatener instead.

Next suppose that these same people are the dramatis personae in a slight variant of Frowe’s Ray Gun.

Duress 2 Villain wants to coerce Victim to kill an innocent person. He places Victim at the bottom of a narrow, dry well and throws him a weapon capable of disintegrating a human body. He then drops Unconscious Victim’s unconscious body down the well. Victim can survive only by disintegrating Unconscious Victim.

The common and I believe correct understanding of Duress 1 is that it is impermissible for Victim to kill Unconscious Victim. If he does kill her, he may not be blameworthy but he will have acted wrongly. The common intuition about Duress 2, however, is that it is permissible for Victim to kill Unconscious Victim.
Victim in self-defense. Frowe, I think, would argue that the relevant difference is that in Duress 1 Unconscious Victim is an innocent bystander who must be killed exploitative, whereas in Duress 2 she is a direct threatener whose killing would be eliminative. In support of the view that Unconscious Victim is a bystander in Duress 1, one might claim that Victim requires her to be present so that he can kill her as a means of obeying Villain’s command.

I believe, however, that this is a mistake. Unconscious Victim in Duress 1 is not an innocent bystander. What Victim actually needs is for Unconscious Victim not to be present, both earlier and at present. Had Unconscious Victim not been present at all, Villain would have had no occasion to threaten Victim’s life. And if Unconscious Victim were miraculously to vanish, the threat to Victim would vanish with her, as Villain would then have no reason to kill him. It seems, in other words, that Unconscious Victim is, in Frowe’s taxonomy, an indirect threatener, as her physical presence is necessary for there to be any threat to Victim. It is true that Unconscious Victim is neither an obstructor nor a moral obstacle, which are the types of indirect threatener we have discussed, but there are other types. Victim’s killing Unconscious Victim would therefore be eliminative, as it would eliminate the contribution that her presence makes to the threat. He would, of course, kill her as a means, but all eliminative killing is killing as a means.

If this is right, then in both Duress 1 and Duress 2, Victim’s killing of Unconscious Victim would be eliminative rather than exploitative. In both cases, the person who is both causally and morally responsible for the threat to Victim is Villain. In both cases, to defend himself successfully, Victim must kill a morally innocent person who has not exercised any form of agency in contributing to the threat that he faces. The only difference is that in Duress 2, Unconscious Victim’s body is the instrument with which Villain threatens Victim’s life, whereas in Duress 1 it is a gun.

I cannot detect any morally significant difference between the two killings. If I am right that there is no significant difference, these cases support the second premise in the restatement of Otsuka’s original argument in Section 2. Because I suspect that the intuition that it is permissible for Victim to kill Unconscious Victim in Duress 2 is an overgeneralization of intuitions about standard cases of self-defense in which it is permissible to kill someone who threatens one’s life, I think my intuition that it is impermissible for Victim to kill Unconscious Victim in Duress 1 is more reliable. I therefore conclude that it is impermissible to kill Unconscious Victim in Duress 2. Because Unconscious Victim in Duress 2 is just Falling Person in an unconscious state, and Falling Person is, as I noted earlier in this section, a paradigm instance of a nonresponsible direct threatener, I think we should conclude – again – that it is normally impermissible to kill such a person in defense of a single victim.

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